![]() ![]() Given the generalist ambitions of the view, this is equivalent to showing that restrictivism is false simpliciter. The arguments I present in §§2 and 3 of this paper aim to show that restrictivism is false of emotional experience. 1 I will call this general view ‘restrictivism’.Īccording to restrictivism, all conscious experience is sensory, including, of course, emotional experience. It is the downstream specification of a much more general and ambitious view in the philosophy of consciousness, which is currently accepted by most philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists as the standard view, and which purports to restrict all conscious experience within the relatively narrow domain of the sensory. Yet the opposite thesis – namely the thesis that all emotional experience is sensory – is very widespread. ![]() Given that emotion is not the same thing as sensation, it is natural to presume that emotional experience will also not be the same thing as sensory experience. My claim is, on the face of it, reasonably weak and rather plausible. This paper defends the claim that emotional experience is, at least in part, non-sensory. (2022) “Emotional Experience and the Senses”, Keywords: emotion, consciousness, sensory experience, cognitive phenomenology, acquaintance, valence The second argument, which I present in §3, individuates a claim on which most contemporary theories of emotional valence converge and uses it to demonstrate that restrictivism has a false implication: it must deny that valence is experientially felt. The first argument, which I lay out in §2, draws on recent empirical results in emotion research to show that restrictivism cannot be reconciled with the possibility of knowledge of one’s own emotional state by acquaintance. Drawing on intuitive but insightful remarks on the nature of sensation from Plato, I map out the conditions under which the restrictivist thesis is both substantive and plausible. I reconstruct a position I call ‘restrictivism’ and motivate it as part of a reductive approach to mind’s place in nature. ![]() In §1 I introduce my reader to the debate. This paper investigates the nature of emotional experience in relation to the senses, and it defends the thesis that emotional experience is partly non-sensory. ![]()
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